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Abstract. ​In the past few years, several formal models of the social organisation of              
science have been developed. While their robustness and representational adequacy has been            
analysed at length, the function of these models has begun to be discussed in more general                
terms only recently. This paper is a contribution to the general philosophical debate on the               
formal models of the social organisation of science. Its aim is to understand which view of                
science these models end up supporting as a consequence of their philosophical            
presuppositions, which are also in need to be explicated. It will be argued that, because of                
some of their philosophical underpinnings, current formal models of the scientific community            
do not explain the internal role that moral and societal values play in scientific research. It                
will also be discussed whether formal models of the social organization of science can              
actually capture the value-ladenness of science. At the same time, it will be shown that the                
discussion on the formal models of the scientific community may contribute in fruitful ways              
to the ongoing discussions about value judgements in science. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past few years, social epistemologists have developed a series of ​formal models of               
the social organisation of scientific research - or, to borrow from Martini and Pinto (2017),               
‘SOSR models’ - which provide highly idealised representations of the scientific community.            
The pioneering work on SOSR modelling was made by Kitcher (1990), who developed a              
‘marginal contribution/reward’ (MCR) analytical framework. More recent approaches in         
SOSR modelling make use of Agent-Based Models (ABM), computer programs in which            
social groups are represented through a number of individual agents, the rules for their              
behaviour, and their environment. The simulations run on ABMs explain how, through the             
interactions of the individual agents, macro-phenomena emerge at the group level (Axelrod            
1997; Gilbert and Terna 2000). ABMs have been used by social scientists for a long time.                
Social epistemologists have applied this tool to study the social aspects of science, such as the                
impact of knowledge acquisition on subjective beliefs (Zollman 2007, 2010), the optimal            
division of cognitive labor (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009), the creation of new theories within              
a scientific community (De Langhe 2014), and various other topics. Overviews on the most              
discussed SOSR models in philosophy of science have been provided by, among the others,              
Weisberg (2010) and Reijula and Kuorikoski (2019). 
The conspicuous literature generated by SOSR modelling often focuses on some technical            
aspects of specific models. Recently, however, the debate has begun to shift towards more              
general issues. Aside from the technical issues, in fact, there are many questions about the               
function and use of SOSR models in general which deserve to be considered. For example,               
what is the philosophical underpinning of SOSR models, and what is the philosophical             
argument that they are trying to make? Which image of science and of the scientific               
community do they end up supporting? What can philosophers, scientists, and policy makers             
learn from SOSR modelling? Are computer based methods the best ways to argue about the               
social organisation of science? This paper is a contribution to the general philosophical             
debate on SOSR models. Its aim is to understand which view of science these models end up                 
supporting as a consequence of some of their philosophical presuppositions, which are also in              
need to be explicated.  
In the next section, I reconstruct debate around SOSR models. In section 3, I explicate the                
philosophical presuppositions of these models. The problem will be then to understand to             
what extent, because of such philosophical presuppositions, SOSR models end up supporting            
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a value-free image of the scientific community. In section 4, I provide a short overview of the                 
current debates on the role of non-epistemic values science. In section 5, I explain in which                
sense current SOSR models fail to capture the value-ladenness of science. In section 6, I               
question whether such models can actually capture the value-ladenness of science after all.             
Finally, in section 7, I consider how reflecting some limitations of SOSR models may              
actually enrich the current debate on values in science.  
2. The current debate on SOSR models 
A model is, very generally speaking, an abstraction representing a portion of reality, its              
entities and their relations. Models can be used to explain some aspects of the target they                
represent, and may have different forms: mathematical abstractions, as in the case of             
differential equations, physical objects, as in the case of the double-helix model of the DNA,               
and so on. SOSR models represent the scientific community, its ‘agents’ (that is, scientists),              
and their relations. Like all the other models, they can be used to potentially explain some                
features of their target, namely the some aspect of the dynamics of scientific communities. At               
least in the intentions of their developers, the explanations obtained from the SOSR models              
can be used for making policy suggestions.  
SOSR models have had such a ‘normative ambition’ since their inception. Kitcher (1990)             
regarded his own work as providing the basis for policy suggestions: “How do we best design                
social institutions for the advancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored the social             
structure of science. The point, however, is to change it” (Kitcher 1990: 22). Similarly,              
Zollman (2007) uses the results of his simulations to suggest which communicative structures             
are preferable than others in some circumstances. Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) also use the              
results of the simulations run on their model to make suggestions about which populations of               
agents best distribute cognitive labor and is therefore preferable to other scenarios. 
The proliferation of SOSR formal models has led to a growing philosophical literature             
which often focuses on some technical issues, such as their robustness, that is their capability               
of producing outputs which remain consistent even when some of their input parameters are              
modified. Many contributions to the debate on SOSR models analyse the technical problems             
and limitations inherent to particular models. Issues with Zollman’s epistemic network have            
been discussed by Alexander (2013), Frey and ​Šešelja (2019), Rosenstock ​et al. (2017), while              
the Weisberg-Muldoon landscape model has been criticised, among the others, by Alexander            
et al. (2015), Thoma (2015), Pöyhönen (2017), Avin (2019), Bedessen (2019), Hessen            
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(2019). By questioning and modifying some of the problematic assumptions of a particular             
model, some philosophers even end up developing their own SOSR model, or at least their               
own ‘version’ of an SOSR model. For example, Holman and Bruner (2017) have developed              
an epistemic network in which the number of agents does not remain fixed over time and in                 
which some external factors may play a role in the agents’ decision. The already mentioned               
Thoma (2015), Alexander ​et al. ​(2015), and Pöyhönen (2017) have designed more robust             
versions of the Weisberg-Muldoon epistemic landscape. Grim ​et al. (2013) have combined an             
epistemic landscape with a social element of communication: in their model, agents do not              
just explore the landscape, but they also communicate their results with one another, thus              
forming an epistemic network. 
In the past lustrum or so, the focus of the debate on SOSR models has been gradually                 
shifting. Instead of focussing on the technical aspects of particular models, some philosophers             
have begun to discuss the functions of SOSR formal models ​in general​. One of the earliest                
contributions in this sense is provided by Martini and Pinto (2017) who argue that, contrary               
to the ABMs employed in the social sciences, SOSR formal models fail to connect with               
empirical data. As Martini and Pinto rightly remind us, modelling involves (at least) three              
steps: first, the identification of a problem and the selection of a theoretical framework to               
tackle it; second, the construction of a model in the light of some specific assumptions; third,                
the establishment of a connection between the model and the empirical data. In the social               
sciences, the last step is taken by following a number of strategies, such as parametrization               
and model validation; in SOSR modelling, however, no step is taken to bridge the gap               
between models and empirical data. As Martini and Pinto explain, the failure of a model to                
connect with the empirical data is the failure of that model to adequately represent its target                
system. In their view, therefore, it is crucial that SOSR modelling will take up their               
‘empirical challenge’.  
The observations of Martini and Pinto (2017) open the way to questioning the normative              
aims of SOSR models. Thicke (2019), in fact, argues that if these models are descriptively               
inadequate, not only because of some of their problematic assumptions (second step of the              
modelling process), but mainly because they do not connect in any way with the empirical               
data (third step of the modelling process), then they should not be used to support normative                
claims about the social organisation of science. Bedessen (2019) also points out that, since              
they do not capture some important aspects of scientific research, such as pluralism and the               
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co-existence of interlocking objectives and sub-objectives, SOSR models ends up          
misrepresenting scientific communities and may lead to problematic policy advices.  
While some philosophers have questioned the descriptive adequacy and the normative           
function of SOSR models, others have questioned ​whether ​their actual function is to provide              
adequate descriptions and to make normative claims after all. Frey and Šešelja (2018) suggest              
that these models should not be viewed as representations in need of empirical validation, but               
as formal tools which supplement the empirical basis used within some debates in the history               
and philosophy of science. Šešelja (2020), furthermore, claims that SOSR formal models are             
‘abstractions’, the function of which is neither representational nor explanatory but, rather,            
‘exploratory’. She argues that the epistemic function of these models is not to provide              
plausible explanations of the dynamics of actual epistemic communities, but to explore            
philosophical questions such as those concerning the theories of scientific rationality.  
The philosophical and theoretical function of SOSR models is also advocated by            
Aydinonat ​et al. (2020), who feel that focussing only on the model-target dyadic relation is               
limiting. In their view, SOSR models are some of many possible argumentative devices             
which can be used to defend and reinforce philosophical positions. Following this reasoning,             
an SOSR model is to be considered successful if it generates further arguments. For example,               
the Weisberg-Muldoon epistemic landscape ​together with its subsequent versions, which          
were developed by modifying some of its original assumptions, are all part of the same               
‘argumentative landscape’, each new version of the model corresponding to an argumentative            
move. As such, and despite the limitations of the initial version, the Weisberg-Muldoon             
epistemic landscape is a successful SOSR model.  
Considering SOSR models as possessing a philosophical and argumentative function, on           
the one hand, would rescue them from the criticisms about some of their limitations: if their                
function is ​not to provide an adequate representation of actual scientific communities, then             
the fact that they are not empirically validated is not a problem anymore. By doing so, at the                  
same time, the idea that these models can be used to justify science-policy recommendations              
will have to be given up, or at least weakened, despite the fact that such an idea is explicitly                   
held by some of their developers. But even accepting the idea that SOSR models are tools to                 
be used in philosophical arguments, however, there are still a lot of questions to be answered.                
What is, indeed, the philosophical argument these models are making? Which image of             
science do they support? To answer some of these questions, I will uncover the philosophical               
underpinnings shared by many of the current SOSR formal models. 
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3. The ‘Kuhnian project’ 
I regard SOSR models as articulations of what I call the ‘Kuhnian project in philosophy of                
science’, with which I mean something different from the famous model of scientific change              
developed in ​The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ​(Kuhn 1962) and in other writings.             
Regardless of the tenability of that model, it is possible to appreciate Kuhn for establishing a                
new way of practicing philosophy in which normative claims about science are grounded on a               
descriptive account of the dynamics of the scientific community. Even though he has been              
often misinterpreted as claiming that science is irrational, what Kuhn was attempting to do is               
to develop a new ‘social’ theory of scientific rationality. This is why his philosophy should be                
regarded as one of the first attempts at a properly social epistemology of science (Wray               
2011). As De Langhe (2013) suggests, furthermore, the more recent approaches to the study              
of the scientific community, such computer simulations, ABMs, network systems, and big            
data analysis, can all be regarded as an expansion and articulation of Kuhn’s original              
philosophical method. As I will show, current SOSR models are continuous with the             
‘Kuhnian project’ not only because they aim at describing the scientific community, but also              
because they are developed in an attempt to solve some of the problems Kuhn introduced in                
philosophy of science (see Table 1). 
Kuhn’s interest in the dynamics of the scientific community predates the publication of             
Structure​. In his (1959), he described the scientific community as being pervaded by an              
essential tension​: on the one hand, there is a majority of scientists who have a rather                
dogmatic attitude towards the dominant theory, methodology or research programme, and           
who are engaged in routine work; on the other hand, within the scientific community there is                
also a minority of ‘divergent’ and iconoclastic scientists, ready to challenge the dominant             
tradition of research and to develop innovative approaches. Both parties perform vital tasks             
for science: the dogmatic scientists develop, articulate, and apply the established knowledge,            
while the fewer divergent thinkers, by working on alternative approaches, guarantee a            
‘reserve tank’ of alternative theories and methods to be used in case of crisis. Kuhn’s               
description of the essential tension supports a normative argument about risk-spreading           
(D'Agostino 2010). If every member of the scientific community bets on the same theory or               
on the same problem-solving strategy, then the group as a whole would risk too much: the                
theory everybody has endorsed may lose the bet after all, while potentially successful and yet               
‘non-mainstream’ research strategies would have remained underdeveloped or even         
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completely abandoned. By allowing a minority of divergent scientists to work on alternative             
theories and methods, the community as a whole hedges its bets and spreads the risk of error.                 
Not only the scientific community is pervaded by an essential tension, but it also ought to be                 
so. 
While Kuhn showed why it is rational for the community as a whole to maintain an                
essential tension between dogmatic and divergent tendencies, he did not explain why it would              
be rational for individual scientists to adopt the latter. Kitcher (1990) re-elaborates and             
complements Kuhn’s risk-spreading argument in order to solve this problem. His MCR            
analytical model explains why it is rational for self-interested individual scientists ​not to             
choose the project with the highest probability of success. The probability of making relevant              
contributions by working on a research line which does not have the highest probability of               
success, in fact, can be higher than the probability of making an equally relevant contribution               
in an overcrowded research line. By choosing a scientific project with a lower probability of               
success instead, some scientists may actually increase their ‘expected utility’ in terms of             
career advancement, visibility, and prestige. The self-interested choices of rational          
individuals allows the community as a whole to hedge its overall bets. In this way, the                
cognitive labor necessary to reach the epistemic ends of the community as a whole is divided                
across different individuals, so that the essential tension is preserved.  
While Kitcher’s MCR framework complements Kuhn’s risk-spreading argument, the more          
recent computer-based SOSR models were developed by modifying some of its problematic            
assumptions. One of them is that individual agents possess a complete knowledge of the              
current state of research, of its internal division in discrete projects, and of the probability of                
their success. Zollman (2007, 2010) overcomes this difficulty: instead of being all-knowing            
credit-seekers, the agents within an ‘epistemic network’ can and do learn from one another,              
and have their preferences modified accordingly. In this way, Zollman’s model provides a             
refined account of how scientists choose their projects.  
In both Kitcher’s and Zollman’s models, however, agents do not show important            
individual differences: they are either rational agents calculating marginal contributions, in           
one case, or Bayesian agents learning from one another, in the other. These models, in short,                
do not consider that agents possess different attitudes and may be driven by different              
motivations. The ‘epistemic landscape’, first developed by Weisberg and Muldoon (2009),           
overcomes this issue. Their model represents a field of research as a landscape containing              
two ‘peaks’, which agents aim at discovering. Agents move from one patch of the landscape               
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to the other in an attempt to find the best path to get at the top of the peaks. In the model,                      
however, different kinds of agents adopt different exploratory strategies: while ‘mavericks’           
are adventurous and always choose the paths less travelled, ‘followers’ take less risk and              
prefer to walk through the paths which have already been opened by others. In this way, the                 
Weisberg-Muldoon model provides a more sophisticated and refined view of the distribution            
of cognitive labor.  
Finally, all the models discussed so far take for granted the availability of scientific              
theories but cannot explain where new theories come from. De Langhe (2014), who explicitly              
manifests his debts towards Kuhn, develops a ‘unified’ ABM which shows how the             
distribution of cognitive labor leads to both the exploitation of existing alternatives and to the               
endogenous generation of new theories within the scientific community.  
In short, the SOSR models discussed in this paper can be regarded as laying on an ideal                 
continuum originated by Kuhn, with each new model attempting to overcome some of the              
limitations of the previous models by modifying some of their assumptions. To use the              
terminology of Aydinonat ​et al. (2020), all these models belong to the same ‘argumentative              
landscape’. It remains to be seen whether, in virtue of their Kuhnian roots, these models also                



















Table 1: ​the development of the Kuhnian project in philosophy of science 
 
 
4. Value-laden science  
Even though he is widely known for acknowledging the social dimension of scientific             
research, Kuhn regarded himself as an internalist philosopher of science. In his view, social              
factors may occasionally influence the direction a research may undertake, or accelerate the             
rate of scientific change within a particular field, but they do not play a relevant internal role                 
in science. For Kuhn, scientific research activity is ultimately driven by epistemic factors             
alone (Bird 2000, 2013; Wray 2010, 2011). That Kuhn developed a ‘social epistemology of              
science’, in other words, does not make him a ‘sociologist of science’. In fact​, he promoted                
an insular model of the scientific community mainly devoid of immediate social concerns.             
For Kuhn, science makes progress by solving the problems dictated by a dominant paradigm,              
which sets the research agenda and ​contributes to isolate the scientific community from the              
rest of society: “A paradigm [...] can even insulate the [scientific] community from those              
socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form” (Kuhn 1993: 37). In               
some passages, Kuhn even seems to suggest that scientific progress ​depends on the             
segregation of the scientific community from the rest of society, especially when he applauds              
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 Problem Name of the Model Type of Model 
Kuhn Showing why it is rational for the scientific 
community as a whole to spread the risk by 
maintaining internal diversity 
Essential Tension Generalisation from personal 
experience 





Zollman Explaining the mechanisms of information 
transmission within the scientific community 
Epistemic Network Computer simulation 
Winsberg & Muldoon  Showing the optimal division of cognitive 
labor for epistemic progress  
Epistemic Landscape ABM 
DeLanghe Showing the optimal division of cognitive 
labor for balancing ​the exploitation of 
existing theories and the exploration of new 
theories  
Unified model ABM 
“the unparalleled insulation of mature scientific communities from the demands of the laity             
and of everyday life” (Kuhn 1993: 164). 
For Douglas (2009: ch. 3), Kuhn’s insular conception of the scientific community led to              
the establishment of the so-called ​value-free ideal​. While they admit, like Kuhn, that             
non-epistemic values (​i.e., social, political, or moral values) can be important ‘external            
factors’ for science, for instance in the agenda-setting stage, supporters of the value-free ideal              
claim that such values ought not to play any ‘internal role’; for example, they are not                
admitted in the evaluation of empirical evidence or in the justification of scientific theories              
(Sober 2007; Betz 2013; Hudson 2015). The main motivation behind the value-free ideal is              
the defense of the epistemic authority of science: should it be driven by social, political, or                
ethical values, then science would no longer be regarded as providing impartial and objective              
knowledge. 
Several philosophers have questioned the feasibility of the value-free ideal and have            
argued that non-epistemic values have a legitimate internal role in science: in their view,              
science is ​value-laden (Longino 1990, 1995; Kitcher 2001, 2011; Kourany 2010; Solomon            
2001). Some argue that non-epistemic values are necessary when dealing with the so-called             
inductive risk (that is, the risk of making errors which may lead to undesirable consequences               
for society) inasmuch as they do not replace evidence: their role would be, therefore, internal               
but ‘indirect’ (Douglas, 2009; Biddle, 2013). The very direct/indirect distinction has been            
questioned (Elliott, 2011, 2013, 2017), while some philosophers have argued that sometimes            
non-epistemic values may even have a priority with respect to evidence (Brown, 2013). Other              
philosophers have put into question the validity of the very distinction between epistemic and              
non-epistemic values, enriched the taxonomy of values, and studied their interplay and their             
functions in questioning problematic background assumptions (Anderson, 1995, 2004;         
Longino, 1990, 1995, 2002; Solomon, 2001). Since SOSR formal models articulate the            
Kuhnian project, and since Kuhn appears to hold the value-free ideal, it is necessary to assess                
whether SOSR formal models also end up holding the value-free ideal of science.  
A specification is here in order: describing the scientific community as isolated from             
society does not necessarily imply the value-free ideal. In principle, it is possible to conceive               
a scientific community which is separated from the demands of the outside society, but which               
is nevertheless internally driven by moral and social values. Kuhn characterises the scientific             
community as being insulated from society ​and also as being internally driven only by              
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epistemic values (with some social factors playing an occasional external role): in this case, it               
is plausible to consider his view as at least reinforcing the value-free ideal.  
Many SOSR formal models also provide a rather insular view of the scientific community,              
which they represent as a complex but ultimately ‘closed’ system. The evolution of such a               
closed system is not influenced by the external environment but, rather, by an internal              
‘invisible hand’ mechanism (Wray 2000). Such a closedness is a rather strong idealisation,             
since actual social groups, including the scientific community, are influenced by a larger             
social context and, often, social groups and their wider context co-evolve together. This issue              
has been noticed, among the others, by Viola (2015) who urges the inclusion of external               
factors such as the funding mechanisms of science in SOSR modelling. SOSR models also              
rely on other dubious assumptions: for instance, the number of agents within a scientific              
community is usually represented as remaining constant. In this way, SOSR models do not              
realistically represent the turn over of qualified scientists working in scientific research.            
Moreover, they do not seem to capture those instances in which an agent belonging to an                
epistemic community may decide to contribute to the achievement of the epistemic goals of              
another community, not to seek credit or recognition but out of her sense of ‘epistemic               
responsibility’ (Koskinen 2016).  
On the one hand, however, many of the simplifying assumptions of the SOSR models are               
justified: such models are idealisation with a limited scope, their aim is to account only for                
the ​internal characteristics of the scientific community. It could be said, therefore, that the              
existence of external influences on the scientific community is not denied, it is just not               
represented. On the other hand it is also true that there have been some attempts to relax at                  
least some of these simplifying assumptions. For instance, the epistemic network model            
developed by Holman and Bruner (2017) is characterised by an ‘exit-entry’ dynamics, which             
captures the turn over characteristic of real scientific communities, and represents the            
external influence of industrial funding mechanisms in agent’s decisions. Alvin (2018),           
instead, develops his own version of the epistemic landscape model which includes an             
explicit representation of the impact of centralised funding schemes in the distribution of             
cognitive labor. 
In short: although SOSR models do often represent scientific communities as isolated and             
closed systems, some of their most recent versions show that it is possible to include a                
representation of the impact of some external factors on the dynamics of such communities.              
However, in the same way in which an insular representation of the scientific community              
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does not necessarily imply a value-free image of science, so opening such a representation to               
some external factors does not necessarily make the models able to capture the             
value-ladenness of science. It is still to be seen, therefore, whether SOSR models can also               
represent the internal role played by social, moral, political values in science.  
 
5. Do SOSR models represent the value-ladenness of science? 
Some SOSR models represent the scientific community in a way which looks very similar              
to the Kuhnian insular and value-free image. In De Langhe’s unified model, for example,              
both the exploitation of old knowledge and the creation of new theories are produced within               
the scientific community, which appears to be driven by epistemic factors alone. Other SOSR              
formal models seem to indirectly address some ethical issues arising from scientific research.             
Epistemic network models, for example, can be used to study how false or unreliable              
information spreads throughout the scientific community. Clearly, accepting false theories or           
bad evidence may have very important social and ethical consequences. Modelling how error             
or false information can spread through the network, however, is far from capturing the              
internal role of non-epistemic values in scientific research. Current epistemic networks, in            
fact, do not show how such moral, social, or political values influence the acceptance of some                
particular piece of information, or how critical decisions are taken in the face of inductive               
risk. It is not to be excluded that further developments will lead to an enrichment of epistemic                 
networks in this sense.  
There are some SOSR models which at least ​prima facie seem to account for the               
value-ladenness of science more directly. ​SOSR models presuppose the existence of an            
objective (​O​) and of various methods (​M​i​) for reaching it. Both Kitcher’s MCR framework              
and the Weisberg-Muldoon epistemic landscape make use of the notion of ​epistemic            
significance ​to define ​O​. In both models, the agents are represented as actively engaged in the                
pursuit of ‘significant truths’, which are truths that are relevant and useful to particular              
groups of people with practical interests. To look for significant truths means, in a sense, to                
work for the ‘common good’. The social, moral and political values that scientists use to               
make judgements are, in a sense, exogenously given in the models through the notion of               
epistemic significance. By motivating and determining the behaviour of the agents, the            
externally given values captured by epistemic significance clearly play a role in the internal              
working of epistemic communities: some would argue, therefore, that this is all SOSR             
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models would need to provide a value-laden image of science. There are at least three reasons                
for why this line of argument does not work.  
First, it is not entirely clear how using the concept of epistemic significance to define the                
objective of scientific research is sufficient to provide a value-laden image of science. Even              
the supporters of the value-free ideal of science do not deny that non-epistemic values can               
play an important role in the research agenda setting. What they deny is that after ​such a                 
research agenda has been fixed, and ​after ​scientists have begun to work to reach the objective                
(which in fact may be the discovery of a significant truth), non-epistemic values play no               
further role in scientific research. In the way in which they use the notion of epistemic                
significance to define their objective, SOSR models do not seem to propose anything             
relevantly different from what is endorsed by the supporters of the value-free ideal.  
Second, as already explained, SOSR models pre-define ​O ​as a significant truth and assume              
that all the agents agree on how to recognise and assess significance. However, ​O ​could be                
defined in many other ways. For instance, it could be defined as ‘the solution of a theoretical                 
puzzle internal to the scientific community which has little or no relevance for the rest of                
society’. By modifying the definition of ​O ​nothing in the internal dynamics of the SOSR               
models would change: the cognitive labor necessary to reach ​O would still be divided across               
the agents in the same way. It is important to stress that this issue has nothing to do with                   
robustness. A model is robust when its outputs are not sensible to drastic changes in the value                 
or quantities of the input variables and parameters. For example, to assess the robustness of               
an epistemic landscape model it is possible to modify the shape and size of its peaks and of                  
the landscape itself, its homogeneity, and so on. If, however, we assume that the peaks of an                 
epistemic landscape do not represent ‘significant truths’ but, instead, ‘solution of a theoretical             
puzzle internal to the scientific community’, then we are not modifying the value of one of                
the initial parameters, we are just interpreting that parameter differently. The fact that the              
dynamics of the model does not change by changing how we interpret ​O does not indicate                
that the model is indeed robust, but only that with or without the notion of epistemic                
significance the dynamics of the model remains the same. Which in turn means that the               
concept of epistemic significance does no real job in the model. 
Third, for the supporters of the value-laden ideal, non-epistemic values play a role in many               
aspects of science: not only to fix the objectives of research, as even the proponents of the                 
value-free ideal would agree, but also in the choice of the methods for reaching them, in the                 
assessment of the available evidence, in the way in which scientific results are             
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communicated, and so on. Both Kitcher’s framework and the Weisberg-Muldoon model           
assume that ​O ​is a significant truth, but they explain how agents choose how to reach it in                  
different ways. In the first case, by assuming that all the agents use Rational Choice Theory                
to maximize their expected utility. In the second, even though ‘mavericks’ and ‘followers’             
have different exploratory attitudes, all the agents follow the rule of moving from lower to               
higher patches of the landscape. Neither of these models represent how non-epistemic values             
determine the choice of the methods for reaching ​O​. The problem is that methods of scientific                
research do not serve only the instrumental function of helping scientists to reach their goals:               
in many cases, research methods and approaches ​are value-laden and the choice between             
them requires critical decisions and value judgements. 
Following an example provided by Elliott (2017, ch. 4) and based on an actual case study,                
let’s assume that the ​O ​of a research project in the field of agricultural science is to find a                   
way to produce more food in poor countries suffering from hunger issues. Some scientists              
may decide to pursue ​O by following ​M​1​, which consists in the use of biotechnology for the                 
production of genetically modified food. Other scientists prefer to adopt ​M​2​, which consists              
in studying the characteristics of the local land in order to develop and implement better               
agricultural strategies. The probability of success of ​M​1 is higher than the probability of              
success of ​M​2​. It must also be said that working on ​M​1 may be more profitable in financial                  
terms, since it may lead to the development of new techniques which could be patented and                
sold to biotech companies. On the one hand, the scientists who choose ​M​2​, from their part, are                 
not motivated by the probability of future rewards, but by the need to avoid methods which                
they perceive as leading to environmental issues, such as the impoverishment of the terroir.              
For them, in short, ​M​1 is simply too risky, if not plain dangerous for the local communities.                 
On the other hand, however, some of the scientists choosing ​M​1 ​are not motivated by the                
higher probability of success of the method, by the mere possibility of a financial return, or                
by a mixture of the two. If not a definitive solution, ​M​1 ​can still offer a very quick fix to the                     
problem of hunger. In the view of some of the scientists choosing this method, therefore,               
what is really too risky is waiting too long in a context in which people’s actual life is at                   
perils.  
From this example, it is clear that scientists make value judgments not only in deciding               
what they ought to pursue, but also ​how they ought to pursue it. Furthermore, not only                
scientists ​qua scientists make value judgments, but they can also endorse different values             
and, consequently, make different value judgments. In short, like cognitive labor, ‘ethical            
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labor’ too might be divided across the agents of an epistemic community (Politi and              
Grinbaum 2020). Current SOSR models do not account for the agents’ value-judgments in             
choosing the methods for reaching the community objectives, even though such decisions            
may influence the configuration of the distribution of cognitive labor within the whole             
community.  
It must be said that, when he first developed his MCR model, Kitcher (1990) openly               
recognized its limitations: “appealing to human ambition is only the beginning of the story.              
Other psychological mechanisms might bring scientists closer to the [optimal distribution of            
cognitive labor] than they would otherwise have been. Not only many vices from greed to               
fraud play a constructive role, but community ends may be furthered by more salubrious              
traits. Perseverance, personal investment, personal and national loyalties, and devotion to           
political causes may, on occasion, help to close a [community-individual] discrepancy”           
(Kitcher 1990: 18). However, he has never provided an indication on how to incorporate              
these other traits into his model. As it stands now, that model depicts scientific research as                
being driven by a mixture of epistemic reasons (the desire of finding out a piece of truth) and                  
self-regarding interests (the desire of recognition). This means that Kitcher’s MCR model            
does not account for the crucial role that social, moral and political values may play in the                 
distribution of cognitive labor and, therefore, it ends up providing a rather value-free image              
of the scientific community. 
The epistemic landscape model also remains silent about how different agents choose            
different research strategies as a result of their own value-judgments. In an epistemic             
landscape, agents are instructed to move from lower to higher patches, because higher             
patches are epistemically more significant. Nothing, in the model, indicates how they deal             
with the potential impact of choosing a path of the landscape rather than another (i.e., risk of                 
errors, risk of catastrophic consequences, and so on). It is possible to argue that the epistemic                
landscape represents moral decisions and not epistemic ones, or even a combination of moral              
and epistemic decisions, so that each patch of the landscape constitutes one of such decisions.               
The agents could move through the landscape in different ways, and perhaps they will reach a                
peak when they find one of a number of morally adequate decisions. This suggestion,              
however, seems a modified version of the idea that the objective of the community              
represented by the model has to be defined ​a priori as a significant truth. Such a suggestion,                 
in other words, tells us to interpret the patches of the epistemic landscape in a certain way,                 
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without changing any parameters or introducing any new ‘moral rule’ for the agents. With or               
without such an interpretation, however, the dynamics of the model does not change. 
In short: while some SOSR models explicitly represent the epistemic community as            
isolated and value-free, others define such a community as aiming at the discovery of              
epistemically significant truths. As I showed in this section, however, the assumption that the              
objective of scientific research is epistemic significance is not necessary, it has no real impact               
on the dynamics of these models, and it does not capture the role of value-judgments in the                 
choice of methods and, consequently, in the distribution of cognitive labor. 
 
6. Can SOSR models represent the value-ladenness of science? 
At the end of the previous section I argued that interpreting parts of an epistemic               
landscape as representing moral decisions would not really capture the value-ladenness of            
science. What is really needed is not a different way of interpreting some of the assumptions                
of the SOSR models but, rather, providing the agents of the models with some ‘moral               
makeup’ in order to represent how scientists use non-epistemic values to make value             
judgments. Such a task, however, poses some problems.  
As already mentioned, some of the most recent SOSR models are computer based             
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) like those which are widely employed in the social sciences.             
ABMs are useful tools for the analysis of problematic social phenomena which, for obvious              
reasons, cannot be explored empirically. One of the first and most known ABM, for example,               
provides a formal representation of the group dynamics leading to the phenomenon of ethnic              
segregation (Schelling 1971). More recent models, just to mention a few, represent ideal             
scenarios in which criminality can be successfully inhibited (Birks ​et al. 2012), or the              
dynamics leading to the escalation of radicalization (Neumann 2014). In short, ABMs are             
often employed by social scientists to represent and frame several social phenomena with             
clear moral overtones: these models are, in a sense, ‘morally charged’.  
It is important to stress that what the ABMs used in the social sciences do is to model                  
individual preferences and actions leading to large-scale group phenomena which the           
individual agents did not necessarily intend. To make an example: the famous model of the               
production of social segregation developed by Schelling (1971) represents how, as a result of              
individual preferences on the choice of the neighborhood, a social group ends up segregating              
sub-groups belonging to ethnic minorities even though none of the agents is programmed to              
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have racist preferences. In this model, residential segregation of ethnic minorities emerges            
from the complex and re-iterated interactions of virtually non-racist agents: the           
macro-phenomenon is an unintended consequence of individual actions. Although used as a            
tool to understand morally charged social phenomena, Schelling’s model is not a model of              
the moral makeup of its individual agents. The claim that science is not value-laden, by               
contrast, amounts to the claim that scientists consciously apply non-epistemic values to make             
critical decisions and to act responsibly. The social responsibility of science is not the              
spontaneous or even accidental property emerging from the interaction of a-moral           
individuals. Rather, science is socially responsible inasmuch as scientists act ethically. This            
means that the value-ladenness can be properly integrated in SOSR formal models if such              
models could represent scientists as moral agents.  
The possibility of designing moral agents in computational ABMs is the object of an              
on-going debate within the AI community. As suggested by Ruvinsky (2008), ‘rights’,            
‘liberties’, ‘duties’, and other elements constituting a moral framework can be regarded as             
parameters which can be implemented in what she calls ‘computational ethics’. Such            
parameters can be used to model agents holding different ethical standpoints. In this way, it is                
even possible to represent an idealised society in which agents hold different ethical             
standpoints. Ruvinsky’s view is purely theoretical, since she does not clarify how the             
parameters making up ‘moral frameworks’ can be implemented in practice into a            
computational ABM.  
An ABM computer simulation which actually implements an ethical theory for the design             
of its agents has been developed by Mascaro et al (2010). Their ABM represents an evolving                
world, in which the interacting agents can reproduce and pass some of their traits and               
behaviors to the next generation. With this model, they study how phenomena such as              
altruism or suicide emerge and spread across the idealised evolving world. The programmers             
have modelled the moral agents by relying on utilitarian theories. In fact, they explicitly              
claim that utilitarianism is the ​only ethical theory which can be successfully implemented in a               
computer simulation: “In order for computer simulation studies to be informative about            
ethics, we must adopt a point of view which allows us to measure the outcomes. Utilities are                 
the natural currency for measuring ethical outcomes. Utilities also support a very natural             
ethical system, namely utilitarianism, the thesis that what action is best collectively is what              
action is best. Utilitarianism is, in fact, the only ethical system which allows us to measure                
the outcomes of computer simulations and judge them as better or worse” (Mascaro et al.               
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2010: 5). By contrast, other ethical theories, such as deontological ethics or virtue ethics,              
“depend upon the exact semantics of the deontic principles or the virtues, respectively, and              
incorporating semantic understanding into artificial life simulation in any kind of           
sophisticated way requires a prior solution to the problem of natural language understanding”             
(Mascaro et al. 2010, p. 32).  
In order to represent scientists as moral agents in an ABM, it is first necessary to specify                 
which ethical theory can be successfully implemented in an ABM but also which ethical              
theory best describes socially responsible scientists. If, on the one hand, utilitarianism seems             
a good candidate for modelling moral agents in an ABM, on the other hand it is questionable                 
whether responsible scientists are best described by such an ethical theory. For Jonas (1984),              
ethically responsible scientists ought to reflect upon the potential impacts of their research             
and anticipate its consequences: this requires a completely new and never before seen             
future-oriented ethical theory. Other philosophers have argued that what responsible          
scientists need is the far more familiar virtue ethics (Grinbaum and Groves 2013). As argued               
by Mascaro et al. (2010), however, virtue ethics cannot be implemented in computer             
simulations unless one first develops an AI capable of understanding natural language: this is              
one of the most debated issues in AI, going under the name of ‘symbol grounding problem’                
(Harnad 1990). 
Constructing ABM models with moral agents is not impossible in principle. It is still not               
clear, however, whether an SOSR formal model would be able to ​adequately represent moral              
scientists. It is also unclear whether such a model would be able to represent the interplay                
between the ethical and the epistemic dimension: to describe, that is, how and to what extent                
scientists are driven by​ both​ epistemic ​and​ moral or social values.  
 
7. Value-free models in social epistemology, social-free debates about the          
value-ladenness of science?  
It looks like SOSR formal models do not represent the role and function of moral and                
social values in science and it is also questionable whether they could provide such a               
representation. But ​should they? Some would argue that it is not fair to demand that these                
models must explicitly and necessarily represent the value-ladenness of science. After all,            
formal models in the social epistemology of science, like those in the social sciences, are not                
expected to provide a ​complete picture of their target. The value-ladenness of science may              
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just be something that SOSR formal models do not aim to account for. When reflecting upon                
the general function of SOSR models in general, however, it is important to ask ​why such                
value-ladenness is something that such models do not aim to account for.  
One possible answer is merely pragmatic. Constructing artificial models of the scientific            
community is hard, it involves a lot of preliminary assumptions, methodological choices, and             
so on; so far, it has been easier to construct value-free toy-models of science. This, however,                
does not exclude that in the future some new SOSR model will be able to account for the role                   
of non-epistemic values in science. If this is the answer to why current SOSR models do not                 
include the value-ladenness of science, then the argument of this article amounts to             
something similar to the ‘empirical challenge’ launched by Martini and Pinto (2017): it             
would be, in fact, a sort of ‘ethical challenge’ or, in less grandiose terms, an invitation to                 
consider the role of non-epistemic values in the agents’ decisions. 
There is, however, another possible answer. SOSR modellers could say that they are             
interested in modelling the scientific community as being driven only by purely epistemic             
values, or by a mix of epistemic values and personal interests, because such factors are the                
most important internal drivers of the scientific community. This would amount to an explicit              
endorsement of the value-free ideal, in which case a number of questions may arise: Is the                
representation of science provided by SOSR models realistic? Is it even desirable? Could             
these value-free representations of the scientific community be used to advance science            
policy suggestions? Reflecting on the value-free characters of SOSR models shed a new light              
on some of the general questions surrounding their use and function.  
Finally, it is worth stressing how the reflection upon some of the limits in SOSR models                
also contributes to highlight some important limits in the current debates on the             
value-ladenness ideal of science. Despite their problems and limitations, SOSR models have            
done a great deal to advance our theoretical understanding on a number of issues, such as: the                 
difference between individual and collective rationality in science, the optimization of the            
distribution of cognitive labor in the scientific community, how communication may           
influence scientists’ choices, the variety of epistemic agents within the scientific community,            
and so on. Even though they can be challenged under several respects - for failing to connect                 
with empirical data, for not providing an adequate representation of the scientific community             
or, indeed, for not taking into consideration the value-ladenness of science - these models do               
provide invaluable philosophical insights about the social organisation of science. If, on the             
one hand, SOSR models miss the value-laden dimension of science, on the other, the debates               
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about the value-ladenness of science miss the social dimension of actual scientific research.             
What is usually argued, within such debates, is that, to say it like Rudner (1957), “the                
scientist ​qua scientist makes value judgments”. The problem is: ​which scientist makes value             
judgments? The value judgment maker invoked in this kind of debate is ​the scientist: an               
ideally moral and responsible individual driven by both epistemic and non-epistemic values            
and who takes the right decisions in order not to hurt society. This ideal moral scientist is as                  
much an inadequate representation of actual scientists as the ideal rational agents of the              
SOSR models. But while SOSR models were developed to illustrate, and possibly resolve,             
the tension between individual and collective aims, the debate on the role of non-epistemic              
values in science has not started yet to frame the problem of the tension between individual                
moral character and collective responsibility. As already mentioned in section 5, and as             
argued by Politi and Grinbaum (2020), different members of the scientific community may             
endorse different sets of values and make different value judgements. Not only is it              
questionable whether all individual scientists endorse exactly the same non-epistemic values           
all the time, but it is also not obvious that they always ​apply ​such values in the same way.                   
What is needed, therefore, is not only a claim about the role of non-epistemic values in                
science, but also a description and an explanation of how critical decisions at the group level                
are taken in the face of individual variations in the application and ranking of non-epistemic               
values.  
The ‘ethical challenge’ to SOSR models and the ‘social challenge’ to the debate on              
non-epistemic values in science are, in a sense, complementary. Attempting to bridge these             
two separate branches of the philosophy of science might lead to more complete             
representations of the scientific community and, consequently, to an increased understanding           
of its dynamics. 
8. Conclusions 
Like Kuhn’s original framework, SOSR formal models represent the scientific community           
as a value-free system. While it is possible to justify such a representation by specifying that                
it is an idealization or an abstraction, it remains to be seen whether such an idealization or                 
abstraction is either useful or even desirable. It could be argued that, since non-epistemic              
values do play a crucial internal role in scientific research, the failure to capture the               
value-ladenness of science makes SOSR models descriptively inadequate, if not          
philosophically problematic. However, integrating the non-epistemic values in the makeup of           
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the agents of the current computer-based SOSR models may be a difficult task. Nevertheless,              
reflecting upon the limitations of SOSR models to capture the value-ladenness of science also              
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